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AbstrAct 
Conservation involves decision-making: 
whether planning the treatment of a single 
item or the collection care strategy for thou-
sands of objects. Conservators making deci-
sions about the collections in their care are 
often frustrated by the limitations of the data 
available to inform them. Within conserva-
tion literature, the usual starting point is that 
correct decision-making is ‘rational’, meaning 
decisions are based on weighted evaluations 
of all of the benefits and costs of a range of 
options. This paper describes an alternative 
approach based on an interdisciplinary study 
of psychology literature. Heuristics such as 
‘take the best’, ‘elimination by aspects’ and 
‘satisficing’ are discussed with their applica-
tion to conservation situations. When faced 
with a complex problem and a lack of data, 
conservators may be able to improve the 
quality and efficacy of their decision-making 
for collections care by placing a greater em-
phasis on criteria selection and prioritisation 
over data collection. 
résumé
La conservation-restauration implique la 
prise de décisions, qu’il s’agisse de planifier 
le traitement d’un objet unique ou la straté-
gie de soin pour une collection comportant 
des milliers d’objets. Les restaurateurs qui 
prennent des décisions à propos des collec-
tions dont ils sont responsables sont souvent 
frustrés par les limites des données à leur 
disposition. Dans la littérature de la conser-
vation-restauration, le point de départ habi-
tuel veut qu’une bonne prise de décision soit 
« rationnelle », c’est-à-dire que les décisions 
se fondent sur des évaluations pondérées de 
l’ensemble des avantages et des coûts d’une 
série d’options. Cet article décrit une appro-
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introduction 
Classic (rational) decision-making is often proposed as an appropriate 
model for conservation decisions (Caple 2000). This attitude is in line 
with many business approaches of considering weighted benefits and the 
probabilities of various outcomes to make decisions (Newell et al. 2007). In 
reality, conservators have to make many decisions without complete data. 
Whilst seeking more data is always a valid recommendation, it is not always 
a valid solution. Unless there is a full set of data to accurately establish 
probability of each option, weighted probabilities become as subjective 
as any other decision-making approach. In these instances conservators 
have a choice; they can either bemoan their lack of data or develop their 
decision-making abilities in situations without adequate data. 
This paper reviews decision theories with an emphasis on those that have 
evolved from studies of how people actually make decisions, rather than by 
considering how they should. It compares classical rational decision-making 
models with decision heuristics. It argues that trained and experienced 
conservators have an expertise that they can offer their institution that is 
far more useful than simple data processing capacity. The unique quality 
that expertise offers is the identification of criteria for decision-making 
(Newell et al. 2007). Clarity in defining and prioritising criteria may 
make evaluations simple enough to avoid the need for extensive data 
collection. 
Within collections care literature there has been an argument for a paradigm 
shift away from assessment of damage to an understanding of risk (Waller 
and Michalski 2005). This process calls into question how conservators 
handle risk, a subject discussed elsewhere (Ashley-Smith 1999) and briefly 
below. It has also generated a methodology that is fast becoming associated 
with the risk assessment, the Cultural Property Risk Analysis Model 
(Protect Heritage 2010). This model fits a general drift within society 
to a target driven culture that can, in some circumstances, lead to data 
collection and box ticking counting for more than professional opinion 
or valuable outcomes (Guardian 2010). The collection of inaccurate or 
subjective data masked by over-confident interpretation can offer false 
insight into collection condition. This paper sets out to rebalance collections 
care literature away from collecting figures back to developing thought 
processes. An appreciation of the instinctive ways that people make decisions 
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che alternative basée sur une étude interdis-
ciplinaire de la littérature en psychologie. Des 
concepts heuristiques comme « la recherche 
du meilleur », « l’élimination par aspects » et le 
« seuil de satisfaction » sont discutés ainsi que 
leur application à des situations de conserva-
tion-restauration. Face à un problème com-
plexe et devant le manque de données, les 
restaurateurs pourraient améliorer la qualité 
et l’efficacité de leurs décisions relatives aux 
soins des collections en accordant une plus 
grande importance aux critères de sélection 
et à la hiérarchisation qu’à la collecte de don-
nées. 
resumen
La conservación implica la toma de decisio-
nes: ya sea para planificar el tratamiento de 
un objeto único, o bien la estrategia para 
cuidar una colección de miles de objetos. Los 
conservadores responsables de tomar deci-
siones sobre el cuidado de las colecciones 
a menudo se sienten frustrados por las limi-
taciones de la información disponible para 
poder decidir. Dentro de la literatura sobre 
conservación, el punto de partida suele ser 
que la decisión correcta sea “racional”, lo que 
quiere decir que las decisiones se basan en 
evaluaciones sopesadas de todos los bene-
ficios y costes de una serie de opciones. Este 
artículo describe un acercamiento alternativo 
basado en un estudio interdisciplinario de 
publicaciones de psicología. Afirmaciones 
heurísticas como “escoger la mejor”, “elimi-
nación por aspectos” y “que satisfaga” son 
discutidas con su aplicación a situaciones en 
el campo de la conservación. Cuando se en-
frenten a un problema complejo y a una falta 
de información, los conservadores pueden 
mejorar la calidad y la eficacia en su toma de 
decisiones para el cuidado de las colecciones 
poniendo un mayor énfasis en los criterios de 
selección y la priorización que en la recolec-
ción de datos.
(heuristics) allows the process to be examined and acknowledged, allowing 
for fast and efficient decisions where appropriate. 
clAssic decision-mAKing theories 
One of the first problems with the rational decision-making model is that 
it may describe what (some argue) we ‘ought to do’ rather than what we 
actually do. Rational or ‘normative’ decision-making relies on mathematical 
calculations of the maximum expected utility (MEU) of each possible 
outcome. For each scenario, a range of outcomes are generated and the 
value that the option delivers is calculated. Although values do not have to 
be monetary, the process focuses on calculating and comparing numerical 
values; thus, numerical data must be generated. In conservation, this may 
mean describing the use value of a piece of silk after x thousand lux-hours 
of exposure. This process, also described as Bayesian decision-making, 
is data greedy. Bespoke computer software packages can simplify the 
calculations, but it is the conservator that has to input the values for each 
options. The conservator must also measure or predict the value of each 
outcome considering each variable and an assessment of its impact, and 
likelihood. Other descriptions of conservation decision-making follow the 
format of expected utility by identifying and ranking multiple outcomes, 
even if numerical values are not generated (Keene 1996). 
heuristic decision-mAKing 
Heuristic decision processes (or shortcuts), are those that people utilise 
when under time pressure, or with limited data. Heuristic decision-making 
focuses on making very simple mental calculations based on the comparison 
of very few options against a limited set of criteria (or cues). Heuristics 
can result in the selection of the best option based on a positive or negative 
evaluation of a single criterion. Some psychologists argue that this process 
can be prone to bias (Kahneman et al. 1982), while others argue that 
heuristics can lead to outcomes that are as good as or better than Bayesian 
calculations (Gigerenzer et al. 1999). An understanding of the process of 
heuristic decision-making can offer insight into how to reduce bias and 
improve outcomes. 
Heuristic decision-making happens; it is a necessary survival mechanism 
in a lifetime full of choices. The value to conservators in understanding the 
topic lies in their ability to recognise where heuristics are in operation. and 
by this maximising the efficiency of the decision-making process whilst 
actively working to reduce any bias that heuristics may introduce.
Heuristic decision models involve defining and ranking decision criteria 
and then using minimal effort to test the alternatives against them. The 
‘recognition’ heuristic has been examined by asking non-experts to pick 
a portfolio of shares in the stock exchange simply by selecting companies 
that they recognise. Research shows that this can be as effective as a 
professionally managed portfolio at returning profit (Gigerenzer et al. 1999). 
This heuristic operates with only one cue – recognition. Other approaches, 
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such as ‘take the best’ (Newell et al. 2007), involve prioritising the decision 
cues and then evaluating options against them one at a time, stopping 
as soon as the cues discriminate between outcomes. A similar but near 
opposite strategy of ‘elimination by aspects’ (Newell et al. 2007) involves 
the use of prioritised cues to reject options using cues until all but one 
option is eliminated. The advantage of these methods is that once cues are 
ordered, most of the options will never have to be measured against them, 
massively reducing the data processing requirements of the operation. 
Consider a conservator who becomes aware of some money at the end of 
a financial year and wants to buy monitoring equipment. As there is a very 
limited time to spend the money, the conservator may select suppliers by 
the recognition heuristic, then establish if it would be possible to invoice 
for the equipment within a week (elimination by aspects). It would only 
be if these two heuristic techniques left more than one option that any 
further data on the detailed specifications need to be considered. This 
form of decision-making may appear instinctive, and the proponents of 
heuristics argue precisely that it is; however, recognising and labelling 
the process can save time and allow conservators to commit what little 
time they have to the analysis of the limited options remaining. 
Another heuristic is ‘satisficing’ (Gigerenzer et al. 1999): the process of 
looking for satisfactory outcomes rather than perfect ones. Satisficers 
define an acceptable outcome, then simply stop evaluating options when 
they identify one that matches this good enough level. This approach is 
especially vital in a situation where the available options change, perhaps 
reducing, over time. Think of buying a home or selecting a life partner, 
if you take too long looking you may end up with none. For conservators 
the scenario may be approving a ‘good enough’ fabric for the inclusion 
in a case design, rather than running repeat tests that frustrate the design 
team’s deadlines to the point that they bypass conservation input entirely. 
Any situation that involves the competition for resources involves the 
danger that they disappear before a decision is made. A speedy satisficing 
approach may lead to a quicker and more effective outcome than a more 
perfect but entirely un-fulfilled decision. The efficiency of satisficing is that 
decision makers never have to identify all of the options, thus massively 
reducing the burden of data evaluation.
conservAtion decision-mAKing 
Unlike classic decisions about share prices, gambling or social behaviour, 
most conservation decisions are made about situations that are unique and 
which have very little certain or verifiable data. The common and logical 
approach to this problem is to conduct further research to supply the missing 
data, for example the research on corrosion of iron necessary to plan the 
display of the SS Great Britain (Watkinson and Lewis 2004). However, 
research requires funding, time and expertise. In some situations, this option 
is simply not available. Furthermore, trying to create Bayesian calculations 
for all of the variables in the preservation of a mixed collection in a multi-
site museum opens up a range of outcomes that require unattainable levels 
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of data processing capacity. Whilst the pursuit of scientific research is an 
essential element of the development of the conservation profession, it is 
not always an available solution. 
Consider then using classical decision-making techniques for a typical 
preventive conservation question: should the relative humidity target for 
a museum with a mixed collection be 55±5% or should it be broader, for 
example, 55±10%? For each option, general data could be collected about 
the environmental response of material types to humidity fluctuations 
and this applied to individual items or categories of object defined by 
vulnerability; then, a degree of or a change in risk probability could 
be calculated for each option. The ten agents of deterioration could be 
used to categorise the risks of damage by identifying a percentage loss 
of value from each of the risk possibilities (Waller 1994). This process 
is complex and many conservators would struggle to assign numbers at 
each stage, even if working with curatorial and technical colleagues and 
experts. Whenever an option is defined without fully empirical evidence, 
a best approximation must be made or a subjective decision used. This 
subjectivity seems inevitable when defining loss of value as the nature and 
use of collections changes over time. Inevitably then the process is wholly 
or partially subjective. Any missing data or estimates make this method 
less accurate, and given the time it may take to conduct this process, it 
may furthermore prove inefficient. It could be argued that if the results 
unlock significant resources for improvements in collections care, then 
the research was highly efficient, but the efficiency of the methodology 
can only be validated if the outcome could not have been achieved by 
simpler means. The result is a complex, resource heavy, process that may 
offer neither objectivity nor accuracy. This critique is also offered of 
classical decision-making in general (Gigerenzer et al. 1999). A further 
critique that may be offered is that regardless of intention, the process 
of data gathering can lead to a rather narrow focus on deterioration with 
an element of use to the exclusion of other wider cultural considerations 
(Slogget 2009). 
the decision-mAKing process 
An alternative approach to calculating myriad predicted outcomes is to 
identify and value decision heuristics as an appropriate and inevitable 
way of making conservation decisions. Based on this acceptance, the 
decision maker would identify where heuristics were appropriate and 
move their focus and effort to the careful selection and evaluation of the 
decision-making criteria, rather than on data collection and comparison. 
The focus on decision criteria opens up the scope of decision-making 
and consequently can also create more opportunities to involve others 
(Slogget 2009). 
Decision-making involves several phases including: identifying a problem; 
selecting the criteria for assessing the outcome; hypothesis formulation 
and testing; gathering data; comparing and assessing data; making the 
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decision and implementing it (Henderson 2010). If conservators are aware 
of when it would be most efficient to move effort from data collection and 
comparison to examining ways that criteria can be selected, prioritised 
and evaluated, it will improve their decision-making skills. Where data 
is collected, resources can be focussed on collecting precisely the data 
needed rather than data sufficient to model every possible outcome. 
data collection and comparison 
For effective decision-making it is essential to retain focus on the point 
where the cost of collecting and evaluating data outweighs the benefits. 
This is contrary to the emphasis often expressed in conservation literature 
and exemplified in Appelbaum’s exhaustive work on conservation treatment 
methodology (2007), which offers hundreds of pages on how to collect 
data and almost nothing on the actual process of decision-making.1 If data 
evaluation is against a simple criterion, i.e. a recognition heuristic, both 
the data collection and evaluation is simple. 
Criteria selection 
Resisting the drive towards greater data capture and manipulation that is 
encouraged by greater sophistication in data processing allows conservators 
to retain focus on what outcomes are appropriate and what factors are 
available to measure success. This process need not focus exclusively 
on the conservator making the decision nor on damage functions as the 
main criteria. It is fruitful to set decisions within a wider social context 
and involve other stakeholders in the process. Questions such as why this 
conservation measure is being considered, who will it benefit and how, will 
naturally open up a more interdisciplinary line of enquiry. Furthermore, 
the wider the decision-making criteria are opened up, the clearer the 
decision may become. 
Goal definition and decision-making criteria 
An important starting point in selecting decision-making criteria is to 
identify the desired outcomes, or goals from the process (Kahneman et 
al. 1982). Conservators should consider whether they aim to make things 
better than the present state or whether they consider the perfect outcome 
and work out how close they can get to that final state. Prospect theory 
describes how these two subtly different approaches (change state or final 
state) will impact on the evaluation of the success of a project and the 
approach to risk in decision-making (Kahneman et al. 1982). Classical 
decision-making process, such as expected utility theory (EUT), advocates 
starting from the final state, or assets (Newell et al. 2007). Almost inevitably 
both the predictable and actual outcomes will fall short of this desired 
final state. Prospect theory suggests that this inevitably means that the 
outcome is framed by decision makers as a loss encouraging risk aversion. 
In contrast, where an outcome is conceived as better than the current state, 
the decision maker will perceive outcomes as a gain which increases 
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tolerance of risk. Neither approach could be called ‘correct’ but the impact 
should be recognised. Given that the ultimate outcome for collections is 
decay (albeit at a rate moderated by astute conservators) prospect theory 
offers the conservator the caution that setting goals informed by the best 
outcome leads to a risk aversion with all but the smallest risks.
criteriA selection over dAtA collection 
Michalski’s stimulating paper on Social Discount Rate (2008) demonstrates 
the EUT approach to deciding outcomes. This process utilised the software 
system AnalyticaTM to model the relationship between mixed collections, 
their decay and value over time in order to decide on priorities for collections 
care. This data hungry process provided convincing evidence that it is 
beneficial to consider both the important as well as the urgent (Covey 2004). 
If more focus had been given to considering the criteria by which decisions 
should be made, could a similar answer have been generated more simply? 
Defining who we are preserving collections for and concluding that this 
is the most important criteria would allow the conservator to follow the 
‘take the best’ (TTB) heuristic, meaning that decisions on priorities could 
be decided against a single criterion which best discriminates between 
outcomes (Gigerenzer et al. 1999). Conservators may be nervous of 
this approach, considering it over-simplistic. This approach provides no 
reason to decry those researchers that have the opportunity to investigate 
problems in detail; it simply offers an alternative to those for whom this 
is not viable.
heuristics or rAtionAl decision-mAKing? 
The choice between heuristics and techniques such as EUT should become 
explicit and considered. In practice, different factors will impact on the 
type of decision-making process that a person will adopt. For example, if 
a person is aware that they are likely to be held accountable for a decision, 
or feel that it is important they are likely to consider more criteria and 
evaluate more options when making decisions. Given the context in which 
conservators work, it seems inevitable that they will state a preference for 
non-heuristic approaches. However, this only maintains logical consistency 
if the rational approach actually offers a more accurate decision. Adopting 
the cloak of rational decision-making by engaging in complex weighting 
processes but undermining it with estimation and subjectivity must be the 
worst of both worlds, with neither the confidence provided by EUT nor the 
efficiency of heuristics. Researchers have shown that in many situations 
the outcome of decisions made using heuristics are as accurate or useful 
as those made by more complex routes (Gigerenzer et al. 1999).
To return to the example of the conservator making decisions about 
collections care in a large mixed collection: they could with total validity 
use the Waller and Michalski (2005) method, which would focus them on 
a path of data collection perhaps committing several conservator years. 
Alternatively, they could look at the ‘who what why’ questions and engage 
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in a consultation process with stakeholders. They would spend a larger part 
of their time considering what the vital decision-making criteria were and 
if these would positively select outcomes (TTB) or help reject outcomes 
(eliminate by aspects). With a much narrowed field of options they may 
return to a more detailed analysis to discriminate between the criteria that 
are important to all those affected by the decision. 
conclusion 
Weighting and evaluating cues works well with lots of time, data and 
resources, but these halcyon conditions are rare. In many daily life situations 
the heuristics have much to offer. An unquestioning acceptance of rational 
decision-making as the only approach limits the options for conservators and 
may not lead to the most efficient, accurate nor effective decision-making 
processes.
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notes 
1 Neither data nor decision-making appear within the index, but under the title ‘information 
relevant to the treatment decision-making process’ the author notes that ‘all the information 
collected and developed during the characterisation phase contributes to conclusions 
about the object’s current physical state and its physical and cultural history’, but adds it 
is ‘not appropriate at this point to decide on a treatment level’. No other section clearly 
indicates how to move from data collection to decision. 
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